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JEFFERY S. DENNIS'

Federalism, Electric Industry
Restructuring, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Tampa Electric Co.
v. Garcia and State Restrictions on the
Development of Merchant Power
Plants
ABSTRACT
Electricity deregulation in the United States has proceeded at
both the wholesale level, under the jurisdiction of the federal
government, and at the retail level, under the jurisdiction of the
states. The federal government has proceeded quickly to develop a
highly competitive wholesale market for sales of electricity in
interstate commerce. Meanwhile, the few states that have
experimented with deregulation have moved much more slowly,
and most states have either scrapped their deregulation plans or
never chose to deregulate at all. As a result, electricity markets
nationally are governed by a patchwork of varying state and
federal laws and policies, and companies seeking to build power
plants to serve these new competitive wholesale markets for
electricity must navigate this hodgepodge of requirements. One of
the barriers to building new power plants is state siting laws,
which require regulatory approval before new generating plants
may be constructed within the state. In Tampa Electric Co. v.
Garcia, the Florida Supreme Court issued a ruling in 2000
interpreting that state's siting law to restrict the construction of
new power plants in the state to only those plants fully
committed to supplying power to in-state uses. In practicaleffect,
this interpretation of the statute prevents the construction of
power plants intended to serve the interstate wholesale market.
This ruling,and the actions of other states to similarly restrict the
development of power plants intended to operate in the interstate
market, raises concerns under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
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Constitution, and specifically the negative, or dormant,
Commerce Clause. With federal policy marching towards
increased competition in national electricity markets, while states
back away from competition in their own local markets, the
constitutional issues raised by Tampa Electric will require
definitive resolution by the courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity deregulation is the process of stripping utilities of the
exclusive monopoly franchises they were granted by the states and
allowing new power suppliers to enter their territories and compete for
the business of even the smallest electricity consumer. As a result of the
federalist system created by the Constitution, the process of deregulation
in the United States has occurred in two separate but interconnected
arenas. Traditionally, the federal government tightly regulated the
national wholesale market for power, where bulk sales of electricity
(usually between power suppliers and utilities or large businesses)
occur. Since 1992, however, this market has become increasingly
competitive, and many wholesale sales of electricity now occur at
unregulated, market-based rates. There is decidedly less competition at
the retail level, where electricity is sold to homes and smaller commercial
entities, despite efforts by the states that govern these markets to initiate
competition.
Not all states have taken steps to deregulate the sale of
electricity, despite the evolution of the competitive national wholesale
market through changes in federal law. Some states have attempted to
deregulate their electric industries by completely altering the laws that
govern them, from consumer protection rules to laws regulating the
siting of power plants. Other states have deregulated electric rates and
changed other laws governing utilities but left items such as siting law in
the same form it was in during the regulated monopoly era. Still other
states have made no move at all to deregulate. Additionally, at least a
handful of the states that had initiated some form of deregulation are
now backing away from those plans. It is against this patchwork that
energy companies must operate. Companies building power plants to
produce electricity for sale in the national wholesale market and not to
franchised local customers, called "merchant generation," are affected
the most by this hodgepodge of state and federal law.
Merchant power companies have grown dramatically in the last
decade, building new generation plants from coast to coast. The rapid
acceleration in power plant construction in response to the California
energy crisis and increased demand nationwide has drawn the attention
of the states. In legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial arenas,
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some states have attempted to limit, or even completely bar, the
construction of merchant power facilities in their states. Those states
have done so out of a concern over the environmental and natural
resource impacts that these power plants may have on their areas.
The most glaring example comes from Florida. In 1998, Duke
Energy New Smyrna Beach, LLC (Duke), an independent generation arm
of North Carolina's Duke Energy, filed an application in conjunction
with the municipal utility in New Smyrna Beach, Florida, to build a new
power plant on city-owned land. The project appeared to be an ideal
business arrangement for both parties. New Smyrna held an entitlement
to receive 30 megawatts (MW) of power from the project to serve its
retail customers, while Duke could sell the remaining 484 MW of power
from the plant in regional and national wholesale markets at
unregulated, market-based prices.! On March 22, 1999, the Florida Public
Service Commission (PSC) authorized construction of the plant when it
issued an order granting the project a determination of need pursuant to
Florida's Electrical Power Plant Siting Act.2
Several utilities with franchised territories in Florida appealed
the siting determination. In Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed the PSC and stopped the project in its tracks.
The court held that the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act (which
includes section 403.519) does not allow the PSC to grant a determination
of need when, as in this case, a large amount of the output of the facility
is not committed to Florida retail uses.' This interpretation, in practice,
prohibits the construction of most large merchant generation plants in
Florida, because it is unlikely that those projects will ever be fully
committed to in-state uses. The U.S. Supreme Court elected not to grant
certiorari and hear an appeal of the Florida court's ruling.
The result of Tampa Electric raises concerns under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the decision may implicate
the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court's
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides an excellent
framework for analyzing the problems raised by the Florida court's
ruling. While the Commerce Clause concerns raised by Tampa Electric Co.
v. Garcia are real, the cases provide at least some arguments on both
sides of these issues. The cases considering Commerce Clause issues
provide some insight into how the U.S. Supreme Court might have
analyzed the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, had it granted certiorari.
1. Re Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company LLC, 193 P.U.R. 4th 181, 185 (Fla.
P.S.C. Mar. 22, 1999).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.519 (West 1999).
3. 767 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000).
4. Id.
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Additionally, other states seem to be following the lead of Florida,
enacting moratoria or significant restrictions on the development of
merchant power facilities in their own states. Should this trend continue,
such power plants may not have any place that they can be located.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court may be asked to
consider a similar case in the future.
II. FLORIDA BARS MERCHANT POWER PLANTS: TAMPA
ELECTRIC CO. V. GARCIA
A. Facts of the Case
On August 19, 1998, the Utilities Commission of the City of New
Smyrna Beach, Florida (New Smyrna) and Duke filed an application
5
with the PSC for approval of a new power plant. The Joint Petition for a
Determination of Need sought approval for a 514-MW, natural gas fired
combined cycle power plant, together with associated natural gas and
transmission facilities, to be located in Voluisa County, Florida.
The plant was to be constructed under a Participation
Agreement between Duke and New Smyrna. Under that agreement,
Duke would design, construct, and own and operate the project. The
company was also required to provide 30 MW of power from the project
to New Smyrna, beginning in November 2001, at a price of $18.50 per
MW hour. In return, New Smyrna would provide the site for the project,
an interconnection point to the city's substation, and reuse wastewater
and other water sources needed by the project.
Under this arrangement, Duke was left with 484 MW of output
from the plant. Duke planned to sell this power on the wholesale market
to whomever it chose. The company did not plan to sell the electricity
specifically to Florida retail utilities.
B. Proceedings Before the PSC
Duke and New Smyrna filed their application with the PSC on
August 19, 1998. Seven parties intervened, including three traditional
public utilities serving franchised territories in the state: Florida Power
and Light Company (FPL), Florida Power Corporation (FPC), and
6
Tampa Electric Company.
Two of those entities, FPL and FPC, filed motions to dismiss the
application in early September. The crux of their arguments was that
5. See Re Duke Energy, 193 P.U.R. 4th at 185.
6. Re Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company LLC, 193 P.U.R. 4th 181, 185 (Fla.
P.S.C. Mar. 22, 1999).
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Duke and New Smyrna were improper applicants under the Florida
Electrical Power Plant Siting Act because prior decisions of the PSC and
Florida Supreme Court construed the act to allow only in-state retail
utilities, or applicants with contracts with in-state retail utilities, to apply
to the Commission for a determination of need to site a new power
plant.7 In response, Duke and New Smyrna not only challenged this
interpretation of the statutes and precedent, but also argued that such an
interpretation would violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and would be preempted by federal law.8
In its order issued on March 22, 1999, the PSC granted Duke and
New Smyrna a determination of need, allowing them to move forward in
constructing the plant. The Commission first found that Duke and New
Smyrna were proper applicants under the Siting Act, reasoning that
Duke, as a "regulated electric company" (by virtue of the fact that it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC)), met the definition of "applicant" under the statute.9 In reaching
this conclusion, the PSC distinguished a set of precedents known as the
Nassau cases, in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
determination of the Commission that cogenerators who are "qualifying
facilities" under federal law are not proper applicants for a
determination of need under the Siting Act unless specific in-state utility
need is demonstrated.'0 The order then found a specific need for 30 MW
of power for the City of New Smyrna, and that the additional 484 MWs
of power produced by the plant would add to grid reliability and result
in cost savings for retail customers in peninsular Florida as a whole."
The Commission determined that it could properly base a determination
of need on the needs of the entire Florida peninsula, instead of specific
retail utilities. 2
C. Florida Supreme Court Holding
Tampa Electric Company, FPC, and FPL all filed appeals with
the Florida Supreme Court. On appeal, the utilities made similar
arguments to those made before the PSC. The Supreme Court accepted
those arguments and reversed the PSC's grant of a determination of
need. 3
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 195-97.
Id. at 203-05.

13.

Tampa ElectricCo. v. Garcia,767 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000).

12. Re Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company LLC, 193 P.U.R. 4th 181, 203-05
(Fla. P.S.C. Mar. 22,1999).
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In its decision, the court ruled that a determination of need may
only be sought by "an applicant that has demonstrated that a utility or
utilities serving retail customers has specific committed need for all of
14
the electrical power to be generated at a proposed plant." The court
based this ruling on its finding in prior precedent that non-utility
generators are not included in the definition of "applicant" in the Siting
Act.'- The court also noted that the Siting Act's legislative history
indicated a requirement that specific in-state need be determined before
16
construction of a power plant is permitted.
While the court's ruling was based on its finding that the PSC
had exceeded its statutory authority in granting this particular need
determination, the court also addressed the constitutional arguments of
Duke and New Smyrna, made both before the PSC and on appeal. The
court ruled that section 731 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 expressly
left issues of siting and need determination to the states, and thus any
interference with 7interstate commerce was permissible and no
preemption existed.
New Smyrna filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court on December 27, 2000. The Court denied the petition
without opinion on March 5, 2001.18
D. Are Other States Following Florida's Lead?
While Florida is the only state to completely bar the construction
plants, other states are taking action to restrict the
merchant
of
merchant power within their borders. For example, two
of
development
other southeastern states, Tennessee and Kentucky, have taken action to
restrict the development of power plants not intended to serve in-state
customers. In both states, the governor initiated the restriction,
announcing concerns about "the demands on natural resources" from
the new facilities. 9 These actions, like the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia,raise questions about the extent to
which states may place restrictions on the development of electric

14. Id. at 434.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 435.
17. Id. at 436; see 15 U.S.C. § 79, notes (2000) ("Nothing in this title.. .or in any amendment made by this title shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect, or in any way
to interfere with, the authority of any State or local government relating to environmental
protection or the siting of facilities.")
18. Utilities Comm'n, City of New Smyrna Beach, Fl. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 69 U.S.L.W.
3480,149 L.Ed 2d 137 (Mar. 5, 2001).
19. Tenn. Governor, Executive Order No. 31 (Mar. 20, 2002).
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generating plants simply because the plants intend to serve the national
wholesale market instead of the local retail market.
In Tennessee, for example, Governor Don Sundquist signed
Executive Order No. 31 on March 20, 2002, establishing a two-year pilot
project that will institute a new siting process for the development of not
more than four new merchant power plants.2 ° The order replaced an
August 2001 moratorium prohibiting the siting of any new merchant
power projects. According to the governor, the pilot project is intended
to "allow Tennessee to fully assess the economic and environmental
impacts of merchant power plants." 21 Under the pilot project, the state
will assess several factors before approving any of the four new
merchant power plants it will allow in the state, including economic
effects of the plant, available transmission capacity, financial soundness
of the applicant, and environmental impacts.2
Kentucky Governor Paul Patton twice placed a moratorium on
the permitting of new power plants in the state. The second six-month
moratorium, announced on January 11, 2002, was dropped in April 2002
when the legislature passed Senate Bill 257, which created a new scheme
for the location of power plants in the state.3 The legislation
differentiates sharply between merchant facilities and other types of
power plants in the requirements it imposes before the state will approve
the construction of a generating plant. For example, applicants for the
siting of a merchant generator must include an analysis of the potential
economic impact of the new plant on the local economy and an analysis
of the plant's likely impact on the state's transmission system.24 Public
utilities in the state, under the new scheme, are not subjected to these
additional hurdles.
It is likely that state attempts to restrict the development of
merchant power projects within their borders, like those summarized
above, will continue in the future. Catherine Riley, Chairperson of the
Maryland Public Service Commission, recently commented that states
were increasingly concerned about the siting of merchant power plants
and local communities are questioning the benefits of such projects.' Her
comments are but one example of a growing discontent in the states over
the course of electric industry restructuring following California's failed

20.
21.
Creates
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Press Release, Tenn. Dep't of Economic & Community Development, Governor
Pilot Project for Merchant Power Plants (Mar. 21, 2002).
Tenn. Governor, supra note 19.
See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.706 & .708 (Michie Supp. 2002).
Id.
Maryland Official Warns Merchant Generators,ENERGY DAILY, Feb. 28,2002.
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26
experiment with competitive markets for electricity. Thus, the issues
decided upon by the Florida Supreme Court in Tampa Electric are likely
to be revisited again, and these future decisions could have an effect on
the future course of electric industry restructuring and the future
development of the competitive wholesale electricity market.

III. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY
IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EXERCISE IN FEDERALISM
Before considering the specific reasoning of the Florida Supreme
Court in Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and the Commerce Clause implications of restricting the development of merchant power plants, it is
important to understand the technical structure and legal framework
under which the electricity industry operates. The end result of efforts by
Congress and FERC in recent years to encourage the development of
independent power producers (IPPs) and mandate open access to
transmission has been the creation of a highly competitive interstate
wholesale market for electric power. Thus, the industry now operates on
two distinct levels: a national (and more competitive) wholesale market
and local and regional retail markets. As noted above, the development
of independent power plants to serve the wholesale market has given the
traditional public utilities (who serve franchised customers without

competition from other suppliers) more options to meet consumer
demand that do not require that they themselves construct new plants.

As a result, many of the new power plants used to meet today's
increased demand for electricity are owned by IPPs. These entities are
subject to different, and often less, state regulation than a traditional
public utility would be when deciding to construct a new power plant.
A. The Technical and Business Structure of the Electricity Industry
The production and delivery of electricity is accomplished by
of equipment: generation, transmission, and
categories
three
27
process produces electricity primarily via
generation
The
distribution.
26. See generally Phillip S. Cross, State PUCs Show Split Personality: While Electric
RestructuringPauses, Telecom Pushes Forward,PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 15, 2003, at 10; Kathleen
Davis et al., Is DeregulationDead?, ELEc. LIGHT & POWER, Feb. 2003, at 1; Jeremy D. Oler &
Donald A. Murray, CascadingCaution:California Crisis Delays Deregulation,PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Sept. 1, 2001, at 52. For a monthly update on the status of electric industry restructuring at
the state level, see Energy Information Administration (EIA), Status of State Electric Industry
Restructuring Activity, at http: / /www.eia.doe.gov/ cneaf /electricity/ chg-str / regrnap.html
(last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
FRED BOSSELMAN, JIM
27.
THE ENVIRONMENT 654 (2000).

Rossi
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steam (created by the burning of coal or natural gas or nuclear
processes), falling water and internal combustion engines, or turbines.2 8
The electricity generated is moved from power plants and across large
distances to local distribution facilities via the transmission system.
Transmission lines are operated at higher voltage than the local
distribution lines that bring power directly into homes and businesses.
Those higher voltages help to avoid power losses from the lines as the
power is moved but are more costly.2' Additionally, an adequate
"reserve margin," or amount of power above that
which will be
consumed, must be maintained to assure reliability in the event that
generators go out of service unexpectedly.-a Improvements in
transmission technology have minimized line losses and shutdowns,
however, allowing generation developers to locate power plants further
away from population centers and closer to water and fuel supplies.3'
Finally, the local distribution system provides the electricity to endusers.
For the purposes of analyzing statutory issues such as the one in
Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia, it is important to focus on the role of the
traditional investor-owned public utilities and the IPPs, also called
merchant generators. Traditional investor-owned utilities hold a stategranted monopoly to provide electric service to customers within their
franchised area. By holding the rights to the franchise, these utilities have
an obligation to serve customers. IPPs on the other hand have no such
obligation and sell power on the wholesale market at unregulated prices.
Historically, the public utilities were vertically integrated,
meaning they owned the generation, transmission, and distribution
facilities and used them to provide electric service to customers in their
franchised territories.32 As demand for power grew in their franchised
territories, the utilities simply built new facilities to meet the new
demand. IPPs differ principally from this framework in the fact that they
do not own transmission or distribution and do not have a franchised
territory of "captive" customers. These entities operate as purely
speculative ventures, selling power on the wholesale market (and
directly to retail customers where allowed), instead of to a guaranteed

28. See generally Jeffrey W. Meyers & Robert M. Lamkin, Chapter 52: Electricity, in 2
ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS § 52.01[6] (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds.,
2001).
29. Id. at § 52.01[6][b].
30. LEONARD S. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIc UTILsS: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTuRE 4,
28-30 (5th ed. 1994).
31. Meyers & Lamkin, supra note 28, at § 52.01[6][b].
32. HYMAN, supra note 30, at 157.
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category of customers. As of October 2002, IPPs produced 34 percent of
33
all power generated in the United States.
The increased prevalence of IPPs has given the traditional public
utilities new options for meeting their obligation to serve. As noted,
utilities were previously forced to build their own new generation to
meet increases in demand. Today, utilities can contract with the growing
number of IPPs to procure new sources of electricity instead of building
new plants. As the amount of generation in the wholesale market grows,
so too do the contracting options. Utilities can contract with an IPP for a
long or short term and can even buy small amounts of power on the
"spot market" to meet daily demand fluctuations. Through wholesale
power purchases from independent generation sources, the utilities have
been able to avoid the risks inherent in financing new generation plants.
B. The Legal Framework
The development of the electricity industry and its regulation
has led to a complicated overlay of state and federal responsibilities. In
the early 1900s, only state regulation governed the activities of electric
companies. That changed in 1927 when the Supreme Court decided
Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co."
At issue in that case was a Public Utilities Commission (PUC) of Rhode
Island order approving a new rate schedule for the sale of electricity by
the Narragansett Electric Lighting Company, a Rhode Island utility, to
Attleboro Steam & Electric Company, a Massachusetts utility. Under a
previous agreement, Narragansett was generating electricity in Rhode
Island and delivering it to Attleboro in Massachusetts. Narragansett was
losing money under that contract, however, and in the order at issue in
the case the Rhode Island PUC granted their request for a higher rate.
Attleboro challenged the order, arguing that it was an invalid restriction
on interstate commerce, since the power delivery at issue moved across
state lines. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that "the rate is.. .not
subject to regulation by either of the two States;.. .if such regulation is
required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power vested in
Congress." In reaching this decision, the Court explicitly noted that the
sale of power between the companies was "a transaction in interstate
commerce, notwithstanding the fact that the current is delivered at the

33. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Electric Power Monthly: January 2003 1,
availableat http: / /www.eia.doe.gov /cneaf /electricity/ epm/ matrix96_2000.html.
34. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
35. Id. at 90.
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State line. "' The Court found that "the transmission of electric current
37
from one State to another.. .is interstate commerce."
1. Federal laws regulatingelectricity
The Court's holding in Attleboro left unregulated any sales and
transmissions of electricity that passed from one state to another.
Congress responded in 1935 with the first major national electricity
legislation, the Federal Power Act (FPA). The FPA granted the Federal
Power Commission (which would later become the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission) the power to regulate both the rates for
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and the rates charged
for wholesale power sales in interstate commerce.- The act defines
"[s]ale of electric energy at wholesale" as "a sale of electric energy to any
person for resale." 39 FERC approves rates that it finds are "just and
reasonable." 4 Under the FPA, FERC also has the responsibility of
assuring adequate interstate electric service. Additionally, the agency has
the power to direct and coordinate interconnection and transmission
activities. 4' This power has become important in recent years, as the
agency has attempted to mandate open access to transmission lines.4
The FPA is clear in its grant to FERC of comprehensive authority
over wholesale electricity sales in interstate commerce and the
transmission of energy in interstate commerce, and its grant of authority
over the facilities used for such sales and transmission. The act is also
clear in what it does not grant the federal government authority to
regulate. The savings provision of the law denies FERC jurisdiction over
(1) facilities used for the generation of electricity, (2) facilities used for
local distribution of power to retail customers, (3) facilities used for
transmission of electricity strictly in intrastate commerce, and (4)
transmissions of electricity to be used entirely by the transmitter.4
The Supreme Court has considered the extent of the FPA's grant
of power to FERC on several occasions. In Connecticut Light & Power v.
Federal Power Commission," decided seven years after the passage of the
FPA, the Court held that federal jurisdiction over electric energy, while
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
at 86.
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2000).
16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2000).
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see also Shelia S. Hollis et al., Chapter 3: Federal Regulation of
Energy Transactions, in 1 ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS § 3.03[1] (David J. Muchow &
William A. Mogel eds., 1991).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 824a.
42. See text accompanying notes 61-70, infra.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1).
44. 324 U.S. 515 (1945).
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intended to follow the flow of electricity into interstate commerce, is
limited by the Act's command that it "extend only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the States."45 In so holding, the
Court specifically noted the difficulties of regulating a resource like
electricity, which "is such that if any part of a supply of electric energy
comes from outside of a state it is, or may be present in every connected
distribution facility."" This interconnected nature of the industry
required that regulation of electricity be halted by the act's artificial
limitation; otherwise, federal jurisdiction (based on the fact that
electricity is in interstate commerce) would extend to "a toaster on the
breakfast table."4 7
Later cases from the Court also wrestled with the extent of
federal jurisdiction over electric power, given the highly interdependent
and interstate nature of the electricity industry and the electric
transmission grid. In Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power and Light,
the Court found sufficient interstate commerce in the generation plants
and transmission lines of FPL to allow for the assertion of federal
jurisdiction, even though all of the company's plants and lines were
located within the state.4 The Court reached this conclusion because
FPL's transmission lines were connected to the Florida Pool, a power
°
poo 9 whose members were connected with utilities in Georgia.!
Because there was no evidence that FPL power was not leaving the pool
when the Georgia utilities drew electricity from it, the Court reasoned
that federal jurisdiction should attach.
The energy crisis and oil embargos of the 1970s spurred
Congress to pass the next major piece of energy legislation, the National
Energy Act of 1978."' The most important portion of this act turned out to
be the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). This legislation
attempted to encourage the development of new electricity generation
by requiring electric utilities to buy the power produced by non-utility
generators, called "qualifying facilities" (QFs). The act defines QFs as
cogeneration facilities and generators powered by renewable sources of
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000).
46. Conn. Light & Power,324 U.S. at 529.
47. Id.
48. 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
49. Utilities located near each other often form power pools to "build larger generating
units, have power available at times of emergencies, plan systems without duplicating the
work of neighboring companies, and increase their ability to buy low cost power from
others." HYMAN, supra note 30, at 27. The utilities in a power pool often "run their
generation and transmission operations on a joint basis." Id.
50. 404 U.S. 456-57 (1972).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles
15, 16, 42 & 43 U.S.C.); see Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Industry Restructuring:A Case Study
in Government Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827,834-35 (1998).
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fuel that are smaller than 80 MWs.1 2 As defined in the statutes, cogeneration facilities produce "(i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms
of useful energy (such as heat) which are used for industrial,
commercial, heating, or cooling purposes." 3 To be certified as a QF, these
facilities must meet certain minimum efficiency standards. 4 Once the
generator has met these requirements, it can sell its power to the local
utility at that utility's "avoided cost," or what it would have cost that
utility to generate the electricity itself.
The passage of this law was the main force behind the initial
development of IPPs in the United States. By 1993, there were 1200 QFs,
representing ten percent of new generation.5 5 The QFs (and other IPPs)
were limited, however, because they could not gain access to the
transmission grid to sell their power to a wider market, since the local
utility was under no obligation to give them such access. FERC's only
power under PURPA with regard to transmission was the power to
order the local utility to interconnect with a QF."
Partially in response to the problem of QF and IPP access to
transmission, Congress passed the most recent important piece of energy
legislation, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). 7 That law gave FERC
greater authority to order local utilities to open their transmission lines
for use by other power suppliers. Specifically, EPAct amended the FPA
to give FERC specific authority to order utilities to transmit wholesale
power over their transmission facilities."s EPAct also allowed entities
engaged exclusively in wholesale power sales to become exempt from
the holding company ownership restrictions in the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA),- by seeking designation as an
"exempt wholesale generator" (EWG). 60
After using its new powers under EPAct on a case-by-case
basis, 61 in 1996 FERC promulgated "open-access" transmission regula52. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17) (2000).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 796(18).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17).
55. Tomain, supra note 51, at 840; see also Preamble, Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access, Non-Discriminatory Transmission Service by Public Utilities, 61
Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,545 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385) [hereinafter
Order 888].
56. Tomain, supranote 51, at 840.
57. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
titles 15, 16, 25, 30, 40, 42 & 49 U.S.C.).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2000).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (2000).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a.
61. See, e.g., Florida Municipal Power Agency, 65 F.E.R.C. 61,125 (1993) (ordering the
transmission of wholesale power "in the public interest.") This order "was widely
recognized by industry experts as a clear message that FERC was serious about 'leveling
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tions under the authority of EPAct. Commonly known as Order 888, the
rules require public utilities that own, operate, or control facilities "used
for transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce" to provide open,
non-discriminatory transmission service. The goal of the Commission in
issuing the rules was to "remove impediments to competition in the
wholesale bulk power marketplace." 63 Specifically, Order 888 requires
transmission-owning entities to file open-access transmission tariffs with
FERC that contain minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory
transmission service. Order 888 also required the transmission owning
entities to take transmission service for their own wholesale sales and
purchases under the provisions of their own tariff (meaning, essentially,
that it must purchase transmission from itself), in an attempt to provide
truly non-discriminatory open access. Finally, Order 888 required
transmission-owning utilities to separate, or "unbundle," the
transmission portion of their service from the generation and power
marketing function.
It is important to note the jurisdictional aspects of Order 888.
While FERC has clear authority under the FPA to regulate the wholesale
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, its authority to
regulate retail transmissions in interstate commerce is somewhat less
clear, given that the FPA prohibits the agency from ordering retail
transmission.6 In Order 888, however, FERC imposed the open access
requirements of the rule on unbundled retail transmissions that occur in
interstate commerce.65 Therefore, the open access requirements apply if
the transmitting utility has voluntarily unbundled its transmission
function and offered retail access to its customers, or if a state has
required it to do so.' FERC did not, however, impose the open access
rule on the transmission portion of bundled retail sales, stating that such
a step would result in "difficult jurisdictional issues." 67 The Supreme
Court upheld FERC's determinations in this regard against a challenge
contending that it took too much regulatory power from the states, who
felt their power over retail markets was being compromised, and against
a challenge that it regulated too little, brought by power marketers and

the competitive playing field' between transmission users and transmission-owning
utilities." BOSSELMAN, Rossi, & WEAVER., supra note 27, at 732.
62. Order 888, supra note 55, at 21,540.
63. Id.
64. Suedeen G. Kelly, Electricity, in THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW & POLICY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 12-29 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2000).
65. Order 888, supranote 55, at 21,571.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 21,577-78.
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independent generators who hoped FERC would completely open retail
markets to competition.6
Following up on Order 888, FERC has continued to press on
with efforts to develop a fully competitive wholesale power market on a
national scale. In 2000, FERC issued Order 2000, strongly encouraging
(but not requiring) public utilities to place their transmission facilities
into Commission-approved regional transmission organizations. 69 The
Commission's intent in issuing this order was to further promote open
access to the national transmission grid to give competitive generators
more markets for their product. Additionally, in 2002 FERC issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking to alter the open access
transmission tariffs currently in effect pursuant to Order 888 to create a
single, standard design for electricity markets nationwide. 70
These actions by Congress and FERC, when taken together,
show a consistent federal policy goal of promoting competition in the
generation of electricity for sale in the national wholesale market. This
march of federal policy is important to consider when analyzing state
prohibitions on the development of competitive wholesale merchant
generation plants like those imposed by the decision in Tampa Electric.
2. State regulationof electricity
Traditionally, state regulation of electric utilities has been
primarily concerned with the regulation of rates charged for electric
service. Classic rate regulation by the states usually takes the form of
"cost of service" regulation. Under that model, rates are determined
by
taking into account the costs incurred by the utility in providing service,
adding a reasonable rate of return for the utility's investors. 71 This has
been the predominant method of ratemaking, although it is certainly not
the only possible course to follow, since the Constitution only requires
that rates not amount to a taking. 2

68. New York et al. v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
69. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Dec. 20, 1999) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. § 35.34). Regional Transmission Organizations are intended by the regulations
to be independent, grid running organizations meeting certain minimum characteristics
and performing certain minimum functions designed to ensure both independence and
reliability. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34 (2002).
70. See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service
and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (to be
codified in 18 C.F.R. Part 35).
71. Lynn R. Coleman & Matthew W.S. Estes, State Utility Commission Regulation of
Energy Transactions, in 1 ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS § 4.02 et seq. (David J. Muchow &
William A. Mogel eds., 1991).

72. Id.
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The power to set rates drives state regulation of utilities. State
Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) review actions of the utility to
determine their prudence and reasonableness and effect on the utility's
overall costs, which will affect rates. State PUCs also approve utility
construction of new generation or other facilities. Here as well, prudence
and reasonableness are assessed. A utility may not be able to recover its
costs for the construction and operation of a new facility if the PUC
determines that it is not needed to adequately serve the utility's
customers, and thus is not a "reasonable and prudent" investment.7
When a state institutes deregulation and retail competition in its
electricity industry, it discontinues rate regulation over the public
utilities. Instead, rates are determined according to market forces. The
public utilities no longer have captive monopolies in their service areas,
and other suppliers are allowed to become a certified electricity provider
in the state and compete for retail customers. Since the PUC is no longer
determining the rate an electricity provider may charge, the PUC also no
longer has the power to determine the prudence and reasonableness of
utility actions that would be included in regulated rates. Thus, the state
has less regulatory oversight concerning the building of new facilities or
other similar matters.
C. Florida's Electric Power Plant Siting Act
One area states have retained control over, even after
deregulation, is the location, or siting, of new electric power generation
facilities. State siting authority originated, in part, "from the state's
7
desire to control overbuilding at the expense of the ratepayer." With the
increased awareness of environmental problems and the passage of the
first environmental laws in the 1960s and 1970s, states began to consider
factors beyond the economics and rate impacts of a proposed new power
plant.7 Many states began requiring their PSC, or a specially created
siting board, to consider environmental and aesthetic factors "outside the
traditional realm of power system economics" when considering an
application to construct a new power plant. 76
Even though Florida has chosen not to deregulate its retail
electric market (and therefore still retains traditional rate-regulation
authority), its siting statute provides an excellent example of state siting
regulations and is the source of the dispute considered in Tampa Electric
73.

Id.

74.
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75. Id. at 57-58.
76. Id. at 58.
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Co. v. Garcia. The Electrical Power Plant Siting Act (Siting Act) was
originally passed in 1973.7 The Florida Legislature stated that its intent
in passing the act was to ensure "that the location and operation of
electrical power plants will produce minimal adverse effects on human
health... [and] the environment." 78 The act establishes the process for
approving the siting of a power plant in the state. The provisions of the
act apply to most types of electric generation plants and their associated
transmission lines but specifically exempt facilities of less than 75 MW
unless the applicant decides to apply for certification under the act.7
The law defines an applicant as "any electric utility which
applies for certification pursuant to the provisions of this act."8 Electric
utility, in turn, is defined as
cities and towns, counties, public utility districts, regulated
electric companies, electric cooperatives, and joint
operating agencies, or combinations thereof, engaged in, or
authorized to engage in, the business of generating,
transmitting, or distributing electric energy."'
Thus, each of the entities noted in the definition of electric utility is
presumably a proper "applicant," as that term is defined in the statutes.
The key provision in the Siting Act is section 403.519, titled
"Exclusive forum for determination of need," which provides the
following:
On request by an applicant or on its own motion, the
commission shall begin a proceeding to determine the need
for an electrical power plant subject to the Florida Electrical
Power Plant Siting Act .... The commission shall be the sole
forum for the determination of this matter .... In making its
determination, the commission shall take into account the
need for electric system reliability and integrity, the need
for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, and whether
the proposed plant is the most cost-effective alternative
available .... The commission's determination of need for an
electrical power plant shall create a presumption of public
need and necessity. 2
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.502 et seq. (West 2002).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.502; see also Nassau Power Corp. v. Beard, 601 So. 2d 1175,
1178 (Fla. 1992) ("The Siting Act was passed by the legislature in 1973 for the purpose of
minimizing the adverse impact of power plants on the environment.").
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.503(12) (West 2002).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.503(4).
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.503(13).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.519 (West 2002).

77.
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This provision was added to the Siting Act in 1980. Previously, the
Commission was only required to prepare a report and recommendation
on the need for electric generation capacity.'
In conjunction with the need determination process, Florida PSC
regulations have required that before submitting an application for a
determination of need, the utility must issue a Request for Proposal
(RFP) to consider "supply side alternatives to... [its] next planned
generating unit."4' Essentially, the rules require that the utility describe
the power plant it intends to build and solicit proposals from other
companies to construct and operate the project. Under the regulations,
the utility still makes the final decision as to whether it will build the
project, or whether a bidder will construct the new capacity. Since the
decision in Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia, these regulations have come
under fire from out-of-state companies. No utility in the state has ever
chosen a bidder over itself under these rules.5 In January 2003, the PSC
made some changes to these rules that are intended to require local
utilities to provide more information to competitors for the RFP.8
IV. THE ANALYSIS AND REASONING OF THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT IN TAMPA ELECTRIC CO. V. GARCIA
A. Applicable Florida Precedent: The Nassau Cases
The most relevant state precedent on the issue of whether nonutility generators were proper applicants for a determination of need
under the Siting Act are two cases identified by the parties as the "Nassau
cases." In these cases, the PSC, and eventually the Florida Supreme
Court, addressed the issue of need determination when the applicant
was a non-utility generator (like Duke, in this case) who was also a
qualifying facility (unlike Duke, in this case) under PURPA.
83. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000). The statutory
language requiring a report and recommendation is still contained in the Siting Act at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 403.507(2)(a); the need determination provision in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.519
provides that the determination of need "shall serve as the commission report" as required

by § 403.507(2)(a).
84. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-22.082 (1994).
85. Out-of-state power companies long argued that these rules unfairly discriminated
against them and have argued that an independent party should evaluate the RFP and
make the final selection. See Nicole Ostrow, Florida Regulators Probe Power Plant Bidding
Process, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 19, 2002; Fla. PSC Studies Changing Electricity Bidding
Process, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 2, 2002; Cherie Jacobs, Florida Regulators Seek Change in
Power-PlantBid Rule, TAMPA TRiB., Oct. 1, 2002.
86. See Changes Made to Power Rules, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003. At the time this
article was finalized for publication, a copy of the final changes to the rule could not be
obtained. It is believed that the basic core of the old rules, however, was retained.
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In the first case, Nassau Power Corp. v. Beard (Nassau 1), the
appellant (Nassau) was a cogenerator who was also operating as a QF
under both state and federal law.87 Prior to the events of this case, when
the applicant for a determination of need was also a QF, the PSC would
presume that need existed, based on the fact that the amount of
cogenerated power that would be produced and ultimately required to
be purchased by retail utilities under PURPA had already been
approved through the Commission's cogeneration regulations. In 1989,
the PSC issued an order announcing that it would no longer adhere to
such a presumption and would instead evaluate need for cogenerated
power based on the individual needs of the retail utilities ultimately
required to take the power.8 Nassau I was actually a challenge to a later
order of the Commission, which adhered to this new policy and required
that a contract signed by Nassau be considered in a separate need
determination proceeding. The court, however, operated under the belief
that Nassau was actually attempting to challenge the prior order and
dismissed the challenge." In a footnote in the case, the court rejected an
argument by Nassau that the Siting Act does not require need to be
determined on a utility specific basis, finding the PSC determination in
its 1989 order "consistent with the overall directive" of the Siting Act. 90 In
expressing support for the Commission's elimination of the presumption
of need, the court noted that "[p]resuming need under the Siting Act by
way of the cogeneration regulations, however, presented the awkward
possibility that individual utilities would be required to purchase
electricity that neither they nor their customers actually needed." 1 In
other words, the determination of need process was still appropriate for
QFs, because the local utilities would be required to purchase the power
generated by the facility pursuant to the mandates of PURPA. Thus,
ratepayers would still be subject to paying the costs of the facility.
In Nassau Power Corp. v. Deason (Nassau II), Nassau appealed a
final order from the PSC denying a petition for a determination of need. 92
In the case, FPL (an in-state retail utility) had filed a petition for
determination of need to build a joint generation project. In the course of
that proceeding, FPL stated that it would have 400-500 MW of need in
years 1998 and 1999. 9' Nassau submitted its own petition for
determination of need, offering to contract the power from its project to
87. Nassau Power Corp. v. Beard, 601 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1992) (NassauI).
88. Id. at 1177.
89. Id. at 1178.
90. Id. at 1178, n.9.
91. Id. at 1177.
92. 641 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1994).
93. Id. at 398. Later, in the proceeding on FPL's joint petition, the utility was found to
need between 800 and 900 MW of power for those years. Id.
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94
FPL at a lower price than that proposed in FPL's joint application. The
Commission dismissed Nassau's petition, again ruling that non-utility
generators were not proper applicants pursuant to the Siting Act. The
court affirmed the dismissal, finding that the decision comported with its
9
earlier rejection of Nassau's arguments in Nassau i. -

B. The Reasoning of the Court in Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia
The Supreme Court of Florida was essentially presented with
three questions in Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia, based on the PSC decision
below. In its order approving the project, the Commission held (1) that
Duke and New Smyrna were proper applicants under both the text of
the Siting Act and decisional law; (2) that the City of New Smyrna had a
specific need for the 30 MW of power it was contracted to receive from
the project, and that the remaining 484 MW of output from the plant
would enhance grid reliability and provide cost savings for peninsular
Florida as a whole; and (3) that it could properly determine need for the
purposes of section 503.419 on the basis of the entire Florida peninsula,
instead of specific retail utilities.96
On appeal, the appellant utilities argued that the need
determination provision of the Siting Act does not allow the Commission
"to grant a determination of need to an entity other than a Florida retail
utility regulated by the PSC whose petition is based upon a specific
demonstrated need of Florida retail utilities for serving Florida power
customers." 97 The utilities also contended that the Nassau cases should
govern the resolution of the case and were not properly distinguished by
the PSC. They noted that the federal statutes enacted to open wholesale
markets to electricity competition were all enacted after the Siting Act
and that the legislature had not amended the act during that time to
allow for a determination of need to be granted to merchant power
plants.98 Finally, the appellants argued that Duke itself was not a proper
applicant under section 403.519 because the company is not a Florida
retail utility and joining with New Smyrna could not cure this deficiency,
since only 30 MW of the project were committed to the city."
Duke and New Smyrna countered with the contention that
Duke's status as an applicant depended on whether it was a regulated
utility under the Siting Act. They argued that Duke satisfied the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 399.
See text accompanying notes 6-12, supra.
Tampa Electric, 767 So. 2d at 431.
Id.
Id.
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regulated utility requirement because it was subject to federal regulation.
The appellees also argued that the PSC was correct in not applying the
Nassau cases to this petition, because those decisions were made in the
context of qualifying facilities under federal law, where retail ratepayers
will ultimately bear the cost of any poor decision to construct a power
plant. Further, the appellees argued that prohibiting Duke from applying
for a determination of need would discriminate against out-of-state
commerce and thus violate the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. In a final constitutional argument, Duke and New Smyrna
also argued that any interpretation of the Siting Act requiring Duke to
have contracts with in-state retail utilities for the output of the project
would be preempted by the EPAct, because of its mandate of a "robust
competitive wholesale market."
Instead of considering the three decisions made by the PSC
individually, the court quickly concluded "that this case is resolved on
the threshold legal issue of whether the PSC exceeded its statutory
authority in granting the present determination of need."'00 In making
this determination, the court began by considering the Nassau cases.
Citing those decisions, the court held that the PSC's grant of a
determination of need to Duke and New Smyrna exceeded the agency's
authority because "[a] determination of need is presently available only
to an applicant that has demonstrated that a utility or utilities serving
retail customers has specific committed need for all of the electrical
power to be generated at a proposed plant."10'
The court then went on to discuss the legislative history of the
Siting Act. The court began this discussion by noting, "In enacting the
Siting Act, the Legislature recognized a need for statewide perspective in
selecting sites for power plants because of the 'significant impact upon
the welfare of the population, the location and growth of industry and
the use of the natural resources of the state.""'
The opinion also
recounted the history of the amendments to the Siting Act noted above.
According to the court, this history affirmed the conclusion it had
reached based on the Nassau cases:
Our reading of this statutory history leads us to conclude
that the present statutory scheme was intended to place the
PSC's determination of need within the regulatory framework allowing Florida regulated utilities to propose new
power plants to provide electrical service to their Florida
customers at retail rates. This need determination...
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 433.
Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
Tampa Electric Co., 767 So. 2d at 435, citing Ch. 73-33, § 1 at 73, Laws of Fla.
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contemplates the PSC's express consideration of the statutory factors based upon demonstrated specific needs of
these Florida customers.'0 3
Based on its decision to follow the Nassau cases and its
consideration of the legislative history, the court reached its final holding
that the Siting Act "was not intended to authorize the determination of
need for a.. .power plant.. .not fully committed to use by Florida [retail]
customers."" "Rather," the court stated, "we find that the Legislature
must enact express statutory criteria if it intends" to allow the PSC to
approve plants not fully committed to in-state retail uses." "Such
statutory criteria are necessary," the court continued, "if the Florida
regulatory procedures are intended to cover this evolution in the electric
power industry." °6
After reaching this holding, the court briefly disposed of Duke
and New Smyrna's constitutional claims. The court stated that it found
"no merit" in the arguments, reasoning that, "[als to any alleged
preemption or interference with interstate commerce, we find that
power-plant siting and need determination are areas that Congress has
expressly left to the states." °7
As support for this finding, the court cited section 731 of the
EPAct, which states, "Nothing in this title.. .or in any amendment made
by this title shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect, or in
any way to interfere with, the authority of any State or local government
8
relating to environmental protection or the siting of facilities."" Thus,
the court seemed to be stating that the EPAct provides congressional
approval for states to pass legislation concerning the siting of power
plants whose provisions might otherwise violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause, while also assuring that federal electricity law would
not preempt state measures designed to control the siting of facilities.
V. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS OF
RESTRICTING MERCHANT POWER DEVELOPMENT
Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and similar actions likely to emerge in
other states raise stark concerns under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court's decision imposes an outright
barrier on power plants built to produce electricity destined for the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Tampa Electric Co., 767 So. 2d at 435.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 79, notes (2000).
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national market, and not simply for retail customers within the state. The
later actions from other states, following Florida's example, place
significant restrictions on the construction of merchant plants within
their borders. The resulting impact on the interstate market in electricity
implicates the Commerce Clause. But, as noted above, the Florida
Supreme Court determined that the Commerce Clause did not apply
because Congress, in the Energy Policy Act, had permitted the state to
impede interstate commerce with regard to matters of siting of
generation facilities. Other similar state actions, both already emerging
and likely to emerge in the future, may also operate on the premise that
no Commerce Clause restrictions apply.
A. A Brief Introduction to the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause, Section 8, Clause 2 of the Constitution,
provides Congress with a clear and affirmative power to "regulate
Commerce.. .among the several States." The courts, however, have also
interpreted the clause to have a "negative" or "dormant" aspect,
prohibiting state and local governments from enforcing laws that "place
°
an undue burden on interstate commerce."'O
This judicially constructed
concept has been developed and refined by the Supreme Court since its
1851 decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, where the Court first
recognized (although implicitly) that the commerce power also prevents
the states from acting to restrict commerce flowing outside of their
borders."'
In H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, the Court stated the reasons
why a "Dormant" Commerce Clause is recognized under the
Constitution:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every
market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will
withhold his export, and no foreign state will by customs,
duties, or regulations exclude him. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every
producing area in the Nation to protect him from the
exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders;
such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it
reality."
109.
110.
111.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 317 (2001).
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
336 U.S. 525,539 (1949).
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Because the Dormant Commerce Clause can act to invalidate state laws
112
strict constitutional
in the absence of congressional action,
are often critical of
Thomas
and
constructionists like Justices Scalia
"3
Still, the dormant
guise.
its
under
courts acting with broad power
in precedent
entrenched
so
become
aspect of the Commerce Clause has
power.14
and
existence
its
to
consent
will
Scalia
Justice
that even
To a limited extent in the early Dormant Commerce Clause
cases, and to a greater degree in the recent cases, the Court has focused
5
on economic protectionism by the states." In the early 1880 case of Guy
v. Baltimore, for example, the Court invalidated a special charge imposed
by the city of Baltimore against out of state shippers using the city's
wharfs."6 In reaching this decision, the Court stated, citing an even
earlier decision, that a state cannot "build up its domestic commerce by
means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry and
business of other states."1 1 7 The more recent decisions of the Court have
8
followed this theme, beginning with H.P. Hood." As the Court stated in
City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, "The opinions of the Court through the
years have reflected an alertness to the evils of "economic isolation" and
protectionism....Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected
by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been
erected."" 9
B. Some Applicable Methods of Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
As noted above, the judicial concept of the Dormant Commerce
Clause has evolved significantly since the Supreme Court first grappled
with it in Cooley v. Board of Wardens 2 In Cooley, a Pennsylvania law
required that ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia employ a
local pilot. The Court upheld this requirement against a challenge that
the law was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In so
doing, the Court noted for the first time that the Commerce Clause,
while not "expressly exclud[ing] the states from exercising an authority
over its subject-matter," does restrict the states from passing legislation

112.
113.
TATION:
114.
115.

See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 109, at 317.
See, e.g., id. at 322; see also, e.g., CRAIG R. DUCAT, 1 CONsTrruTIONAL INTERPREPOWERS OF GOVERNMENT 465 (6th ed. 1996).
See DUCAT, supra note 113, at 465-66.
BORIS I. BnrrKER, BITrKER ON THE REGULATION

§ 6.06 (1999).
100 U.S. (10 Otto) 434 (1880).
Id. at 443.
See generally BrIrKER, supranote 115, at § 6.06.
437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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that regulates certain forms of commerce.12' The Court went on to
articulate a test: "Whatever subjects of this [commerce] power are in
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress."'2 Therefore, subjects that are peculiar
to localities, such as the need for local ship pilots to properly navigate
local waters, may be regulated by the states without offending the
Commerce Clause. '1
The Court gradually abandoned this "local/national subject
matter" test, and its attempt to draw "rigid categories," in favor of a
balancing approach. 2 At the same time, as noted above, the Court was
focusing its Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence more heavily on
economic protectionism by the states.'2 Professor Bittker argues that as
the Dormant Commerce Clause balancing approach developed, labeling
a piece of state legislation "economic protectionism" rendered the statute
almost per se unconstitutional. 26 In Pike v. Bruce Church, the Court
attempted to synthesize a set of general rules from the cases:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state
statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously
stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as
follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken
a balancing approach in resolving these issues, but more
frequently it has spoken
in terms of "direct" and "indirect"
27
effects and burdens.
From this general statement, and an analysis of the Court's
major opinions regarding the Dormant Commerce Clause, three methods
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id.
See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 109, at 325-26.
BITrKER, supra note 115, at § 6.06[A].
Id.
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted).
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of analysis of potential Dormant Commerce Clause problems emerge
that are useful for analyzing the problems of power plant siting raised by
the decision in Tampa Electric. First, cases in which the statute in question
looks like "economic protectionism" or has indications of an attempt to
erect a barrier at the border of the state are subject to the strictest
scrutiny, requiring both a highly legitimate (perhaps even compelling)
state interest and a showing that the state cannot accomplish that interest
28
in a manner that is less burdensome of interstate commerce. Second,
and really a subset of the economic protectionism cases, are cases that
have been dubbed "resource isolation cases. " "I These cases are subject to
a similarly high standard of review by the Court.'30 Finally, laws that are
facially neutral with regard to whether or not they are intended to
economically protect a state are subject to a lower standard of scrutiny,
epitomized by the summary statement in Pike v. Bruce Church.'
Additionally, the Court has consistently recognized that
Congress, in the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers, may
specifically grant the states the power to "restrict the flow of interstate
132
commerce," a power that they "would not otherwise enjoy." Stated
differently, "If Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate an
aspect of interstate commerce, any action taken by a State within the
scope of the congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to
Commerce Clause challenge.""3 The Florida Supreme Court relied on
this concept in upholding the state's siting statute against a commerce
clause challenge.
Electricity is clearly in interstate commerceM and, thus, afforded
protection under the Commerce Clause. State attempts to restrict the
development of merchant power plants, therefore, can be analyzed
under each of the three methods of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
Each analysis indicates that the events in Florida raise significant
128. See, e.g., Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 351 (1951); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1987); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186 (1994). See text accompanying notes 135-145, infra, for discussion.
129. Michael B. Browde & Charles T. DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Resource
Extraction and the Commerce Clause: Federalism'sModern Frontier,60 OR. L. REV. 7, 30 (1981).
130. See, e.g., West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). See text accompanying notes 150-178, infra, for discussion.
131. 397 U.S. at 142.
132. Lewis v. BT Inv.Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,44 (1980).
133. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 652-53
(1981).
134. See, e.g., Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 529 (1945)
(noting that "if any part of a supply of electric energy comes from outside of a state
it.. .may be present in every connected distribution facility"); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 757 (1982) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce
than electric energy....No state relies on its own resources in this respect.").
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constitutional questions that will continue to arise as the electricity
industry moves to further deregulate and other states take actions to
restrict the development of power plants intended to provide power to
deregulated markets. Additionally, the question of whether the FPA or
EPAct of 1992 authorizes the states to restrict the flow of commerce
when exercising their traditional power to regulate the siting of
generation plants must be considered.
C. The Court's Economic Protectionism Analysis: Do State Merchant
Power Plant Prohibitions Survive?
When the Court finds that a state statute is intended to
economically favor in-state businesses or residents, through "proof
either of discriminatory effect or discriminatory purpose," a heightened
standard of scrutiny is applied. 13 Several twentieth century cases from
the Court epitomize this higher standard of review. One of the earliest
cases to utilize this heightened standard of review is Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, where a city ordinance prohibited the sale of any milk that
was not "processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant
within... five miles from the central square of Madison."'3 The ordinance
was challenged by an Illinois milk distributor. The Court struck down
the ordinance as a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, first
noting that the regulation "in practical effect excludes from distribution
in Madison wholesome milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois." 137 In
striking down this regulation, the Court reasoned that Madison, "even in
the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of
its people," could not exclude milk produced in areas outside of the fivemile radius "if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to
conserve legitimate local interests, are available."'
This case suggests two important factors that will alert the Court
to "economic protectionism": (1) prohibitions on the entry into the state
of out-of-state goods or the export of goods out of state ("barriers at the
borders") and (2) facially obvious attempts to favor an in-state industry.
The decision in Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia,interpreting the Florida Siting
Act to bar the construction of merchant power plants within the state,
arguably reflects both of these factors. Since most merchant power
developers come from out-of-state, one could label the decision as one
that bars out-of-state goods (power plants) from entering the state.
135. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981) (citations
omitted).
136. 340 U.S. 349, 350 (1951).
137. Id. at 354.
138. Id.
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Similarly, it can certainly be argued that the Siting Act, as interpreted,
erects a barrier at the border with regard to the transmission of electricity
when it prohibits merchant power facilities simply because the power
they produce may be transmitted out of the state. The need
determination process in place in Florida, while not erecting an express
prohibition against the movement of power out of state, certainly
effectively prohibits that movement, because it will not allow (under the
Tampa case) for the siting of a power plant whose output is not
committed to in-state uses. This fact makes the Tampa case very similar
to Dean Milk, where the invalid city ordinance restricting the sale of milk
did not contain an express prohibition on the movement of milk across
jurisdictional boundaries but erected one in practice.
Mitigating against this argument, however, is the fact that the
Florida Siting Act, even as interpreted, does not effect an outright
prohibition of the transportation of power out of state. Unlike Dean Milk,
Florida's act does not expressly state that no power plant may be built if
the electricity it generates will be transmitted out of state. It is only when
the law is placed in practice, and the need determination process begins,
that it places its restrictions on interstate commerce.
A strong argument can also be made that the Siting Act, as
interpreted, amounts to a facially obvious attempt to favor in-state
industry in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. As the
experience with the RFP process required under the Florida PSC
regulations has shown, in-state utilities have unanimously chosen
themselves to construct new power projects, to the disadvantage of outof-state companies. This seems equivalent to directly favoring in-state
industry at the expense of interstate commerce, as was the case in Dean
Milk and other cases applying the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The test established in Dean Milk requiring that a discriminatory
statute serve a legitimate local interest, and that no nondiscriminatory
alternatives be available, has framed the Court's analysis in subsequent
cases. While examples abound, one of the more recent and most useful
cases is West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, where the Court analyzed the
dormant commerce clause implications of a Massachusetts milk pricing
order that placed an assessment on milk sold by dealers to retailers in
Massachusetts and then distributed the proceeds of the assessment to instate dairy farmers.139 West Lynn Creamery, which purchased roughly 97
percent of its raw milk from out-of-state dealers, challenged the statute,
arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause.'4 The state argued that the
pricing order was valid because the subsidy payments to Massachusetts
dairy farmers were a permissible exercise of state power and because the
139.
140.

512 U.S. 186 (1994).
Id. at 188, 191.
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assessment was an even-handed non-discriminatory tax, applying to all
dealers of milk within the state, not just out-of-state milk."' The Court
held that "granting respondent's assertion that both components of the
pricing order would be constitutional standing alone, the pricing order
nevertheless must fall." 142 The Court reasoned,
respondent errs in assuming that the constitutionality of the
pricing order follows logically from the constitutionality of
its component parts. By conjoining a tax and a subsidy,
Massachusetts has created a program more dangerous to
interstate commerce than either part alone. Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, are
generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate commerce, in part because "[t]he existence of major
in-state interests adversely affected.. .is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse." However, when a
nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of
the groups hurt by the tax, a State's political processes can
no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse,
because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise
113
lobby against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.
This reasoning of West Lynn adds another factor that will alert
the Court to economic protectionism that is particularly applicable to
Tampa Electric: the ineffectiveness of the political process to protect the
interests of out-of-state commercial entities. Utilities within Florida are
highly unlikely to object to the provisions of the Siting Act as interpreted
by Tampa Electric, and, therefore, the in-state political machinery does not
protect out-of-state utilities. The request for proposal (RFP) process,'"
and the need determination process in the statute itself, clearly allows
Florida utilities to dictate the process by which new generation capacity
is added in the state. In short, it allows the entrenched in-state utilities to
determine the rules of the game. Experience has shown that the local
utilities favor this approach and have uniformly chosen themselves over
outside bidders to build additional generation to meet the state's need,
as determined by the PSC. Under this scenario, it seems unlikely that the
interests of Florida utilities will ever sufficiently align with the interests
of out-of-state independent generators, such that the latter entities will
be protected in the local political process from economic discrimination.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199-200 (citations omitted).
See text accompanying notes 84-86, supra.
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Thus, the concerns of the Court in West Lynn are clearly implicated in
Florida.
The foregoing analysis suggests that outright prohibitions on the
construction of merchant power facilities, such as the Tampa Electric
decision's interpretation of Florida's Siting Act, are unlikely to survive
the highest level of constitutional scrutiny under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The Court has not always, however, struck down
legislation labeled as economic protectionism. In rare cases, the Court
will find that a state interest outweighs the burden that the state has
imposed via its regulation.14' Also, more recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence has shown a tendency on the Court to support state
regulatory powers under the Tenth Amendment." For these reasons, it
should not be assumed that such statutes would not survive Supreme
Court scrutiny.
D. Prohibitions on the Construction of Merchant Power Facilities in
Light of the "Resource Isolation Cases"
A subset of the economic protectionism cases concerns state
efforts to protect natural resources, often involving "the isolation of a
state's natural resources from interstate business and consumers in sister
states. ' '4 These cases are particularly applicable, in some respects, to
Tampa Electric. Professors Browde and DuMars have labeled these cases
"resource isolation cases.""' Not only does the analysis of the Court in
these situations apply to the simple case where a state prevents the
movement out of a state of a natural resource such as coal, oil, or water,
but it will also apply in situations where a state wishes to block an item
from entering the state for the purpose of protecting its own natural
resources.
Two early decisions from the Supreme Court epitomize the cases
in this subset. In West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 149 and Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia,is' the Court tackled state measures aimed at prohibiting the
movement of natural gas out-of-state. In West, an Oklahoma statute
prohibited the construction of natural gas pipelines unless the builder of
the pipeline expressly stipulated that it would only transmit gas to

145. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
146. See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
147. Browde & DuMars, supra note 129, at 30.
148. Id.
149. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
150. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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points within the state.15 The statute also prohibited out-of-state
corporations from ever being licensed or permitted to transport natural
gas in the state.5 2 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia concerned a West Virginia
statute prohibiting the shipment of natural gas outside of the state in
times of a supply shortage within the state.' 3 In both cases, the court
found that the statutes were an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce. The Court in West specifically noted the effect such statutes, if
upheld, might have:
If the states have such power, a singular situation might
result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its
timber, the mining states their minerals. And why may not
the products of the field be brought within the
principle?.. .If one state has it, all states have it; embargo
may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted
at state lines. And yet... "in matters of...interstate
commerce there are no state lines."...This was the purpose,
as it is the result, of the interstate commerce clause."
6'
In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the Court made a similar statement: "A
state law, whether of the state where the gas is produced or that where it
is to be sold, which by its necessary operation prevents, obstructs or
burdens such transmission is a regulation of interstate commerce-a
prohibited interference."' '5
The Tampa Electric court's interpretation of the Florida Siting Act,
requiring the output of a power plant to be committed primarily to instate uses before approval of its construction, can be viewed as
effectively hoarding electricity within the state, for the exclusive benefit
of that state. This effective blockade of the out-of-state movement of
electricity makes the Siting Act similar to the laws invalidated in West
and Pennsylvania, which both effected a blockade against the movement
out-of-state of natural gas. Additionally, with other states indicating that
they may follow Florida's lead and restrict the development of merchant
power facilities, the "singular situation" noted in West, in which all states
hoard their products from one another, may be coming to reality in
electric markets."
It is important to recognize that other early Supreme Court
opinions held that natural resources, such as wild animals, are
151.

See 221 U.S. at 262, n.1.

152.

Id.

153.

See 262 U.S. at 582, n.1.

154.

221 U.S. at 255.

155.

262 U.S. at 596-97.

156.

West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
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completely owned by the state, and therefore interstate commerce is not
involved when the state restricts the movement of such resources. 7 To
get around this doctrine, cases such as West held that once a natural
resource such as gas was extracted and reduced to property or became a
commodity, the state could no longer restrict its movement in interstate
158
commerce.
The idea that the state completely "owns" the natural resources
within its borders and can thus restrict its movement without Commerce
Clause consequences was overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma.159 In that case,
an Oklahoma statute prohibited the transport of minnows outside of the
state borders.' 6 The Court quickly ruled that the statute "on its face
discriminates against interstate commerce."16' While the state's interests
in an "ecological balance in state waters" and conservation were
legitimate local purposes, "similar to the States' interests in protecting
the health and safety of their citizens," the Court held that "[t]he fiction
of state ownership [of natural resources] may no longer be used to force
those outside the State to bear the full costs of 'conserving' the wild
animals within its borders when equally effective nondiscriminatory.. .measures are available." 162
This case, and others in the subcategory of "resource isolation
cases," came to epitomize the Court's treatment of state statutes found to
effect economic protectionism. The classic case in both categories is City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.'68 In that case, the Court considered the
Commerce Clause implications of a New Jersey statute that prohibited
the movement into the State of "most 'solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State.""'
As a threshold inquiry, the Court determined that the statute was in fact
a protectionist measure. Even though the legislative findings in the
statute itself stated that the purpose of the legislation was to remedy a
growing waste disposal problem in the state, the Court held that New
Jersey could not accomplish such a goal "by discriminating against
articles of commerce from outside the State unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently."' 5 While it is somewhat
difficult to think of waste as within the realm of natural resources such
that it can be classified with "resource isolation cases," the Court did
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
See, e.g., West, 221 U.S. at 251-54.
441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
See id. at 323, n.1.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
437 U.S. 617(1978).
Id. at 618.
Id. at 626-27.
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specifically find cases such as West and Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia
TM
relevant to its considerations in City of Philadelphia.'
These two cases contain reasoning that is important to the
analysis of Tampa Electric's Commerce Clause implications. In both
Hughes and Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the state had legitimate interests in
conservation and protection of the state's resources and populace.
Florida has, in part, similar conservation and environmental protection
interests in continuing to operate under a Siting Act that effectively
prohibits the construction of merchant power facilities. Even with these
interests, the state's actions in Hughes and Philadelphia preventing the
movement of a resource out of state violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
Another important case to consider, because of its parallels to
the decision on merchant power plant siting in Tampa, is Sporhase v.
Nebraska.167 The Nebraska statute at issue in the case was aimed at
preserving and conserving water resources in the state and restricted the
"withdrawal of groundwater from any well within Nebraska intended
for use in an adjoining [s]tate." One portion of the law required the
receipt of a permit from the Department of Water Resources before
withdrawing groundwater from within the state for transportation to
and ultimate use in another state. 169 The statute expressly forbid the
granting of such a permit if the state where the water was ultimately
destined for use did not grant reciprocal rights for water to move from
that state to Nebraska.17° The parallels between this statute and the
Florida Siting Act are clear. Both prevent the extraction or generation of a
resource within the state if it is destined for use out of state. Both also
include a state permitting function.
The Court in Sporhase, while upholding much of the statute,
struck down the reciprocity requirement before the granting of a
withdrawal permit. In its decision, the Court found the State's
conservation and preservation purposes "unquestionably legitimate and
highly important."' ' However, the Court held that the reciprocity
requirement failed constitutional scrutiny because there was no evidence
presented by the state that it was "narrowly tailored to the conservation
and preservation rationale," and that "when superimposed" on the other
requirements in the statute, it did not advance the state's rationale.'" The
Court noted that if the state could demonstrate a severe statewide water
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 627.
458 U.S. 941 (1982).
Id. at 943.
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 957-58.
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to ease
shortage and the feasibility of shipping water intrastate
7
shortages, then such a restriction might survive scrutiny'
This rationale of the Sporhase Court suggests that outright
prohibitiois on the movement of a resource such as the one that results
from the judicial interpretation of the Florida Siting Act can survive
Commerce Clause scrutiny in at least some instances. Under the Court's
rationale in that case, for example, Florida might be able to successfully
uphold the statute if it could demonstrate a severe statewide power
shortage that could be alleviated through the prohibition on the
construction of power plants intended to serve out-of-state markets.
How the state might craft such a difficult argument is unclear. Florida
might argue that it needs all available transmission capacity to deal with
a severe in-state power shortage, and thus is justified in preventing the
use of transmission to deliver power from merchant plants to customers
out of state.
Another case in the "resource isolation" subset that suggests the
possible validity of outright commerce prohibitions is Maine v. Taylor,
where the Court upheld against a commerce clause challenge a Maine
statute that prohibited the import of live baitfish into the state. 174 In
support of the statute, the state argued that live baitfish could place
native Maine fish species at risk with regard to parasites common in
other states but not normally found in Maine, and that nonnative species
could alter Maine's aquatic ecology.1 5 The state also argued that there
was no effective way to inspect shipments of baitfish from out of state to
prevent such problems. 76 In upholding the statute, the Court agreed with
Maine's contentions, holding that the trial court did not err when it
determined that "substantial scientific uncertainty surrounds the effect
that baitfish parasites and nonnative species could have on Maine's
fisheries."7 Thus, Maine met the legitimate local purpose requirement,
and the fact that there was no method of inspection meant that there was
no less restrictive alternative to the outright ban. This case might also
provide support for an argument by Florida that a severe power
shortage necessitates that all available transmission capacity be reserved
for in-state uses, as noted above, in an effort to defend the Siting Act's
prohibition of merchant power plants against Dormant Commerce
Clause challenge.
The Dormant Commerce Clause cases from the Supreme Court
in the area of "economic protectionism" and "resource isolation" suggest
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Id. at 140-41.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 148.
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several possible methods of reasoning. Parallels with Tampa Electric can
be drawn for almost any of the cases that the Court has reconciled on
dormant commerce clause grounds. Given that most of the cases in these
areas have found the particular state law to be invalid, however, it
would be highly unlikely that the Florida Siting Act, as interpreted by
the Florida Supreme Court, could survive Supreme Court Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. The fact that Florida's Siting Act is arguably
in direct contravention of the federal policy move to wholesale
competition seems to make such a result even more unlikely.
E. The Court's Analysis of Facially "Even-Handed" State Laws
A facially even-handed and non-discriminatory state law, which
applies to both in-state and out-of-state commerce and has only indirect
effects on interstate commerce, may still violate the commerce clause if it
"imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is 'clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.""' Under this line of analysis,
several factors may come into play, and almost any previous test the
Court has utilized in the past can provide an argument on either side of
the issues.1 For example, a court may consider whether the state is
exercising a police power or a commerce power, if the subject of the
legislation is local or national in character, 8' or what other states have
done with regard to the same subject. The Court has "recognized that
there is no clear line" between this category of cases and the economic
protectionism cases noted above. 8
The classic case finding that an even-handed regulation imposed
too great a burden on interstate commerce to survive a challenge is Pike
v. Bruce Church, where the Court set out the test that has survived to this
day.' In that case, an Arizona statute required that cantaloupes grown
in the state be packed in "closed standard containers" approved by the
state. 8 ' The case arose after the state sought to enforce the law against a
company engaged in transporting uncrated cantaloupes from Arizona to
a packing plant in California. The parties stipulated in the case that the

178. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994),
citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1907); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.
v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,578-79 (1986).
179. I feel obliged to thank Professor Ruth Kovnat of the University of New Mexico
School of Law for providing me with this insight during her Constitutional Law class.
180. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
181. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
182. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
183. Brown Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.
184. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
185. Id. at 138.
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practical effect of the statute would be to require the company to build a
packing plant within the state, at a cost of $200,000, or risk losing its
$700,000 crop of cantaloupes. 6 The Court found that the purpose of the
law, "to protect and enhance the reputation of growers within the State,"
was "surely legitimate." 81 7 This legitimate interest, however, could not
"constitutionally justify the requirement that the company build and
operate an unneeded $200,000 packing plant in the State." 18 After stating
the general rules noted above, 9 the Court concluded,
the Court has viewed with particular suspicion state
statutes requiring business operations to be performed in
the home State that could more efficiently be performed
elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly
legitimate local interest, this particular burden on
commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.'90
Thus, the Court found that the Arizona statute placed an unacceptable
burden on interstate commerce in relation to the state's "minimal"
interest in the reputation of its cantaloupe industry.'9'
Under Pike, then, the key question in analyzing a law deemed
"even-handed" is the determination of both the state interests involved
and the extent of the burden the law actually places (in practice) on
interstate commerce. Once these determinations are made, the Court
may then follow any of the methods of analysis or apply any of the tests
it had previously articulated. With regard to restrictions and prohibitions
on the permitting and siting of merchant power plants, the interests of
Florida and the other states following its lead are usually environmental
and aesthetic ones. Essentially, these states are saying, "Not in my
backyard, unless it benefits me directly." The burden these statutes place
on interstate commerce, however, is somewhat more difficult to uncover.
These statutes do not directly prohibit the transportation of electricity
outside the borders of the state, but they do generally require more of
developers wishing to construct a facility that may generate power for
use outside of the borders of the state. The end result of Florida's Siting
Act in practice, in fact, is to prohibit mostly out-of-state merchant power
companies from doing business in the state, because most developers of
the wholesale merchant plants affected by the law are based outside the
state.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 145.
See text accompanying note 130, supra.
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
Id.
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The evolution of the electric industry, to the point today where a
national wholesale market for electricity has developed, leads to a strong
argument that, in the nature of the suggestion in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, the regulation of electricity is now a subject that is more
national than local in character. 92 Technology has allowed electricity to
travel across great distances, lessening any state interest in having its
own power generated within its own borders. Additionally, Congress
and FERC have unequivocally expressed the intention that an even more
competitive national wholesale power market should be developed. This
federal policy directive, it can be argued, has put the construction of
power plants intended to serve national wholesale power markets more
squarely in the national interest.
Cutting against such an argument is Gibbons v. Ogden's
suggestion that, when the state is exercising a police power, it has more
latitude to restrict interstate commerce without violating the Constitution.'9 3 The regulation of the location of power plants for the purpose of
minimizing "adverse effects on human health... [and] the environment"
is a classic example of the state exercise of the police power.194For this
reason, the interests of the states in restricting or prohibiting merchant
power plant development may be heightened.
If a court were to look to what other states have done with
regard to merchant power plant construction, as some of the Court's
cases in this area have suggested, they might find at least some support
for having separate siting requirements for merchant power facilities, as
Kentucky has done. Public utilities and merchant power developers are
separate classes of businesses, and separate classes of businesses are
often regulated by states in a different manner. As long as those
requirements do not rise to the level of an economic discrimination, they
are likely to be subjected to the more deferential even-handed analysis
and to survive that less stringent test.
Some of the cases from the Supreme Court that can be placed
alongside Pike can be further divided into a subset of cases where the
state statute at issue attempts to regulate the out-of-state conduct of
businesses that also operate within the state. The decision of the Court
best illustrating this subset is Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority, where the statute at issue required all liquor
distillers or producers selling to wholesalers within the state to sell at a
price that did not exceed the lowest price it charged to wholesalers in
any other state. '95 The Court held that this requirement violated the
192.
193.
194.
195.
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Dormant Commerce Clause because its practical effect was to regulate
the price of liquor in other states. The Court first noted that the statute
regulated "all distillers of intoxicating liquors evenhandedly," and that
the State's interest "to assure the lowest possible prices for its
residents.. .is legitimate." 196 The statute still violated the Commerce
Clause, however, because "once a distiller's posted price is in effect in
New York, it must seek the approval of the New York State Liquor
Authority before it may lower its price for the same item in other
States." 197 In finding that the statute's practical effect violates the
Commerce Clause, the Court reasoned,
Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State
before undertaking a transaction in another directly
regulates interstate commerce. While New York may
regulate the sale of liquor within its borders, and may seek
low prices for its residents, it may not "project its
legislation into [other States] by regulating the price to be
paid" for liquor in those States 9
Of the cases that might be placed next to Brown-Forman, two
from the lower courts directly concern the state regulation of energy. In
the first case, ANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, a Michigan statute
required "natural gas companies," as defined in the federal Natural Gas
Act, to obtain advance approval from the Michigan Public Service
Commission (MPSC) before issuing any long-term securities.'9 That
definition provides that persons engaged in the transportation or sale for
resale of natural gas in interstate commerce are "natural gas companies.""
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the requirement violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause. In reaching this ruling, the Court
compared the case to Brown-Forman Distillers, stating that similar to that
case, "a requirement that plaintiffs-appellants obtain 'advance approval'
from MPSC before issuing securities, the proceeds of which may be used
to finance a project in another State, directly regulates interstate
commerce. Consequently, we hold that [the statute] directly burdens
interstate commerce.""' The court also noted that under the traditional
Pike v. Bruce Church analysis, the state could not justify the statute,
because the slight benefit of MPSC regulation of project financing (which
196. Id. at 579.
197. Id. at 583.
198. Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted.)
199. 801 F.2d 228 (1986).
200. The Natural Gas Act defines a "Natural gas company" as "a person engaged in the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of
such gas for resale." 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (2000).
201. ANR Pipeline Co., 801 F.2d at 236.
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is already regulated by FERC) did not justify the burden on interstate
commerce. 202
Contrasted with this case is Southern Union Co. v. Missouri Public
Service Commission, where the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Missouri upheld a state statute requiring utilities to receive prior
approval from the Public Service Commission before purchasing the
stock of another utility.w Southern Union Company, which operated a
natural gas utility in Missouri, argued that this requirement violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause, either as a per se violation (due to economic
protectionism), or in the alternative under the Pike v. Bruce Church
balancing test. The parties agreed in the case that the statute's purpose
was to facilitate the Public Service Commission's monitoring of the
business of utility companies, to ensure that ratepayers (from whom
utility companies can recoup losses through the rates charged) were
protected.2 The court first held that the statute was not a per se violation
of the Commerce Clause as an exercise of economic protectionism,
because the statute does not attempt to gain any advantage for Missouri
citizens but instead allows the Public Service Commission to monitor the
corporate structure of utilities to protect ratepayers.2 Under the Pike
balancing test, the court found that the burden on interstate commerce
was minimal when compared with Missouri's "valid interest in assuring
"
the supply of natural gas for its citizens at reasonable rates. 2
The contrast between ANR Pipeline and Southern Union provides
an excellent framework for considering the ultimate issue that arises
when the Pike test is invoked in the context of Tampa Electric: the weight
of the state interest in restricting or prohibiting merchant power plants in
relation to its likely impact on interstate commerce. The key difference
between ANR Pipeline Company and Southern Union Company is that, in
the first case, the state had no interest in protecting ratepayers. In the
second case, however, the utility in question was a traditionally
regulated utility monopoly, and therefore the state had an increased
interest in protecting its citizens from poor financial decision making by
the utility. That interest provided the justification that was lacking in
ANR Pipeline Company.
With regard to merchant power plants, the states have no
interest in protecting ratepayers, because merchant power companies
cannot seek to recover the costs of their projects from ratepayers like
202. Id. at 237. The opinion of the court in this case stated that it was applying a "first
tier," economic protectionism type analysis. The court really seemed to be applying the
analysis used for statutes that are even-handed, however.
203. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (2001).
204. Id. at 1203-04.
205. Id. at 1207.
206. Id. at 1208.
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regulated utility monopolies. Instead, their investors bear the risk of the
projects and seek to recover their costs through sales in the wholesale
market. For this reason, the interests of Florida and the other states in
restricting the development of such plants seems minimal, although
siting laws like Florida's do serve the state's environmental and natural
resource interests.
In short, there are several arguments that might be employed to
decide if statutes like Florida's Siting Act would survive the less
deferential "even-handed" analysis. It would seem that an absolute
prohibition such as Florida's cannot survive under the state's
environmental interests alone. Those interests probably do, however,
support measures that impose different and possibly more stringent
siting regulations on merchant power plants than on plants intended to
serve in-state customers of public utilities, such as the measures recently
adopted in Kentucky and Tennessee. Those measures, while undoubtedly inspired by the increased development of merchant power plants,
still allow such plants to be built, and regulate only their number and
placement. These types of restrictions, and the incidental economic
effects they may have for out-of-state companies, fit more neatly within
the class of statutes the Court has found valid under the more deferential
analysis, because they seem to represent the "less restrictive alternative"
the Court is often searching for in Commerce Clause cases.
F. Congressional Approval of Dormant Commerce Clause ViolationsCourt Treatment of "Savings" Clauses
As noted previously, the Florida Supreme Court quickly
disposed of Duke and New Smyrna's claim that barring merchant power
companies from applying for a need determination to site a power plant
violated the commerce clause by citing to the notes contained in section
731 of the EPAct. The notes in that section state, "Nothing in this title or
in any amendment made by this title shall be construed as affecting or
intending to affect, or in any way to interfere with, the authority of any
State or local government relating to environmental protection or the
siting of facilities." 2° The Florida court found that this section provided
the state with approval from Congress to pass laws regarding the siting
of power plants that might not otherwise pass constitutional muster
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 208 Presumably, the other state
actions described above could have proceeded along, or could be later
defended, under the same interpretation.

207.
208.

15 U.S.C. § 79, notes (2000).
Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428,436 (2000).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress, in exercising
the affirmative power in the Constitution to regulate commerce among
the states, may authorize the states to pass legislation that could burden
interstate commerce. As the Court stated in Western & Southern Life
Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, "If Congress
ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate
commerce, any action taken by a State within the scope of the
congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce
Clause challenge. " 2' 9 According to the authorities, allowing Congress to
grant this power to the states does not "violate the intent of the
commerce clause," because the commerce power granted to Congress
includes not only the
power to promote interstate trade, but also the
210
power to prohibit it.
The examples from the Court in this area generally have
concerned banking and insurance. One oft-quoted example is Western &
Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California,where
the Court set down the general rule noted above. That case, as well as the
earlier case of Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, "' considered the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's declaration that
the continued regulation and taxation by the several States
of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and
that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States ....
The
business of insurance.. .shall be subject to the laws of the
several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business.212
In Western & Southern Life Insurance Co., the Court considered a
commerce clause challenge to a California "retaliatory tax," imposed on
out-of-state insurers doing business in the state, when the out-of-state
insurance company's state of incorporation would impose a higher tax
on California insurance companies than California would impose on that
state's insurers doing business within its borders.13 Congress found that
the McCarran Act permitted California to impose this otherwise
209.

451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981).
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1 (5th ed.
1995); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,434 (1946).
211. In Prudential Insurance, the Court "squarely rejected the argument that
discriminatory state insurance taxes may be challenged under the Commerce Clause
despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act." See Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 654, citing
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012(a) (2000); see Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 653.
213. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 650-51.
210.
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discriminatory tax, stating that its "unequivocal language.. .suggests no
exceptions... [that the] [a]ct removes entirely any Commerce Clause
4
business." 1
restriction upon California's power to tax the insurance
The EPAct language relied on by the court in Tampa Electric
seems far different, and far less specific, than the language relied on in
Western & Southern Life Insurance. It does not appear to contain the same
kind of "unequivocal language," suggesting "no exceptions," that the
Court relied on to uphold California's taxation scheme. A case from the
Court that construed a savings clause of closer analogy is Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., where a Florida statute prohibiting out-of-state
banks from owning or controlling businesses within the state that
provided investment advisory services was held to be an invalid
restriction on interstate commerce.215 In support of the statute, the State
argued that the federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 permitted it
to pass legislation that might otherwise violate the commerce clause.
Specifically, Florida argued that the federal act's prohibition on the
acquisition by a bank holding company of "any additional bank" located
outside its home state, unless the acquisition was specifically authorized
by statute in the state where the proposed acquisition was located,
allowed it to enact the statute at issue.216 Also, Florida argued that the
statute reserved for the states the ability to pass such legislation when it
stated, "The enactment by the Congress of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 shall not be construed as preventing any State from
exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may
hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and
subsidiaries thereof., 217 The Court first held that the prohibition language
in the statute provided no support for the state's contentions, because it
established only "a general federal prohibition on the acquisition or
expansion of banking subsidiaries across state lines," and only granted
the states authority "to create exceptions to this general prohibition...to
permit expansion of banking across state lines where it otherwise would
be federally prohibited."218 With regard to the second statutory provision
cited by the state, the Court ruled that the "section was intended to
preserve existing state regulations of bank holding companies, even if
they were more restrictive than federal law," and was not "intended to
extend to the States new powers to regulate banking that they would not
21 9
have possessed absent the federal legislation." "Rather," the Court

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 653, 655.
447 U.S. 27 (1980).
Id. at45.
See id. at n.12.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48-49.
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stated, "it appears that Congress' concern was to define the extent of the
federal legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law. 22
Given the similarity between the savings clause language
interpreted in Lewis and the language of the EPAct relied on by the
Florida court in Tampa Electric, a similar result would be expected. Thus,
it would be likely that section 731 of the EPAct would be construed in
similar fashion to the savings clause of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, where the Lewis Court found that the statute's statement that it
"not be construed as preventing any State from exercising such powers
and jurisdiction" as it previously had with regard to the banking
industry was not intended, and did not operate, to give the states any
new powers above those they would have possessed in the absence of
federal legislation. 22' Similarly, the EPAct language at issue here
preserves the states' powers over the environmental aspects of siting
power plants that they previously possessed. Under the relevant
precedents, it seems that there is no plausible argument that the
language of section 731 reserves to the states any power to prohibit the
construction of power plants simply because their output would be sold
outside the borders of the state. The states do have this power over
traditionally regulated utilities, because of the consequence for
ratepayers of poor financial decision making. The same holds true for
QFs, because utilities (and thus ratepayers) are required to buy that
power under federal law. But when the consequence to ratepayers is
removed from the analysis, as it is with merchant power plants, the state
loses its ability to restrict power facilities simply because of the ultimate
destination of their output.
Finally, it is important to make note of New England Power
Company v. New Hampshire, where the Court considered a savings clause
from the FPA (which the EPAct amended) stating that the act "shall
not... deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now
exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is
transmitted across a state line. " 22In the case, New Hampshire contended
that this provision granted it the power to prevent New England Power
Company from transmitting hydroelectric power generated within the
state outside state borders. The Court rejected this argument, finding
that the provision in the FPA was "in no sense a grant of power to the
states to burden interstate commerce 'in a manner which would

220.
221.
222.

Id. at 49.
See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 45 n.12 (1980).
455 U.S. 331,341 (1982); see 16 U.S.C. 824(b) (2000).
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court

The legislative history of the Act.. .indicates that Congress
intended only that its legislation "tak[e] no authority from
State commissions." Nothing in the legislative history or
language of the statute evinces a congressional intent "to
alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the
Commerce Clause," or to modify the earlier holdings of this
Court concerning the limits of state authority to restrain
interstate trade2 4
The Court also reasoned, citing Lewis, that "Congress' concern was
simply M'to define the extent of the federal legislation's pre-emptive
effect."'
This interpretation of the FPA, the statute that EPAct amends,
should inform the analysis of section 731's savings clause language. The
New England case only adds to the analysis of Tampa Electric under
Western and Lewis. If Congress's original intent in enacting the FPA was
not to "alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the
Commerce Clause," then it is difficult to argue, without a more explicit
statement of intent, that EPAct was in fact intended to alter the states'
power to otherwise violate the Commerce Clause.
Given the analogies to the precedent in this area of the Court's
jurisprudence, it is difficult to understand how the Florida Supreme
Court came to the decision it reached regarding the savings clause
language of Section 731 in EPAct. The court gave very little reasoning for
its decision. There is no legislative history that is relevant to the savings
provision. The only possible reasons for the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari could be reasons of judicial economy, or an effort to defer to
Congress and the state legislatures (especially the Florida legislature) to
remedy the problem. Of course, the Florida court also simply may have
been wrong.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the federalist system created by the U.S. Constitution,
both the federal and state governments regulate businesses like those in
the utility and energy industries. The Commerce Clause is at the heart of
this federalist creation, limiting the rights of the states to regulate
223. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 341, citing S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769
(1945).
224. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 341 (citations omitted).
225. Id., citing Lewis v. BT Inv.Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. at 49.
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commerce when that regulation may negatively impact the other states.
In essence, it puts the federal power at the forefront when matters of
commerce between the states are involved. This notion of federalism in
the Commerce Clause is what makes issues such as the extent to which
states may limit the development of merchant power plants so difficult,
because those plants operate in interstate markets but have resource
impacts that are largely concentrated in the state where they are located.
The central difficulty is that no state, in limiting or prohibiting
such power facilities outright, expresses an intention to interfere with
interstate commerce. But the development of the electricity industry into
a national wholesale power market, driven by the weight of federal
policy, has meant that such state actions do interfere with interstate
commerce in their practical effect. By prohibiting power plants under a
need determination process, simply because the power from those plants
is not fully committed to in-state retail uses, Florida has in practical effect
prevented the construction of facilities intended to export power in
interstate commerce. Such an action is a direct restraint on interstate
commerce.
While prohibitions like the one Florida's Supreme Court found
in that state's Siting Act stand in direct contrast to the federal policy goal
of competitive wholesale electricity markets, the legitimate environmental and natural resource concerns of the states in enacting such
limitations and prohibitions cannot be overlooked. The states clearly
have an interest, through their police powers, in ensuring that new
power plants constructed in the state do not have an adverse impact on
their natural resources and the health of their residents. It is the conflict
between this state interest and the clear federal policy goals outlined by
Congress and FERC that create the Commerce Clause issues in this area.
The U.S. Supreme Court passed on its first opportunity to
determine the validity of these state actions under the Commerce Clause.
With federal policy continuing to march toward further competition in
wholesale markets, while at least some states are moving to restrict the
development of power plants intended to serve those markets, the Court
is likely to be faced with these issues again. The preceding analysis
suggests the framework that the Court might utilize in deciding such a
case.
In short, these issues are really about federalism and the collision
course between federal and state policy. If Congress does not act, and the
state legislatures do not change their course, a similar dispute to the one
in Tampa Electric is likely to occur. The Commerce Clause is one possible
tool for resolving this dispute. That resolution is likely to favor the
supreme federal power, although, as the analysis above suggests, the
states have legitimate arguments to make about the resource and
environmental impacts such plants will have in their state.
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What is clear is that this conflict must be resolved if there is to be
a sufficient amount of generation to facilitate the open and competitive
wholesale electricity markets contemplated by federal policy. The future
success of any restructuring of the electricity industry depends on the
resolution of these issues, because competition can only occur if there is
enough electricity in the marketplace to create competition. If states
prevent the construction of power plants intended to compete in open
markets, then competition is unlikely.

